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ABSTRACT 
The natural or man-made disaster demands an efficient communication and coordination among first 
responders to save life and other community resources. Normally, the traditional communication 
infrastructures such as landline or cellular networks are damaged and don’t provide adequate 
communication services to first responders for exchanging emergency related information. Wireless ad 
hoc networks such as mobile ad hoc networks, wireless sensor networks and wireless mesh networks are 
the promising alternatives in such type of situations. The security requirements for emergency response 
communications include privacy, data integrity, authentication, key management, access control and 
availability. Various ad hoc communication frameworks have been proposed for emergency response 
situations. The majority of the proposed frameworks don’t provide adequate security services for reliable 
and secure information exchange. This paper presents a survey of the proposed emergency response 
communication frameworks and the potential security services required by them to provide reliable and 
secure information exchange during emergency situations.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is a great challenge for modern societies to cope with crisis situations that arise due to natural 
or man-made disasters. Emergency or crisis management refers to various activities such as 
immediate response, recovery efforts, disaster mitigation, and preparedness efforts for reducing 
the impact of possible future disasters. The timely access to desired information by intended 
person or rescue organization is vital for successful emergency management operations. 
Depending upon the intensity and coverage area of a disaster, it might be a multi-organizational 
operation involving government authorities, public authorities, volunteer organizations and the 
media. These entities work together as a virtual team to save lives and other community 
resources [1]. In emergency situations, the availability of telecommunication services is of great 
importance. These systems provide a means for communication among first responders and 
affected people. During Hurricane Katrina, several wireless base stations were taken out and 
various communication cables were damaged. The remaining parts of the network were not able 
to provide adequate communication services to first responders [2]. Mobile ad hoc networks [3], 
wireless sensor networks [4] and wireless mesh networks [5] are commonly used as 
communication means in such type of situations. These systems are easily deployed without 
need of any existing telecommunication infrastructure. These networks automatically configure 
when new nodes join or leave the network dynamically.  
Reliable and robust communication is vital for successful emergency management operations 
[2]. The emergency response operation is hierarchical in nature, where information and 
instructions flow along a chain of entities. For example, disaster site videos and other related 
information is transferred from first responders to their local command centres and respective 
remote headquarters. Similarly, the instructions and site maps are communicated from remote 
headquarters to local command centres and first responders for efficient emergency 
management. Efficient emergency management requires the continuous flow of bi-directional 
information among first responders and emergency management headquarters. If there is some 
interruption in this flow, it may cause mismanagement of emergency response efforts.   
During emergency situations, the deployed ad hoc communication network might be vulnerable 
to faults and security threats [1]. In large scale emergency management operations, the 
participating nodes may belong to several rescue teams and there is a possibility that a subset of 
nodes may experience faults or demonstrate selfish/malicious behaviour. The faults might occur 
due to some damage during field level emergency management operations. The emergency 
response network deployed during a man-made disaster such as 9/11 may be more vulnerable to 
malicious threats for creating more panic situation. The selfish nodes may drop the routing and 
data messages for saving their battery life. The malicious nodes may try to temper with the 
routing and data messages or inject erroneous messages in the network. These behaviours affect 
the reliability of emergency response networks and might result into mismanagement of 
emergency response efforts.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the most common security 
challenges for emergency response communications. An overview and potential security 
challenges for ad hoc, sensor and mesh networks for emergency situations are described in 
section 3, section 4 and section 5 respectively. Section 6 presents comparative analysis of the 
proposed schemes based on the security services offered by them and section 7 concludes the 
paper.  
2. SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
COMMUNICATIONS  
Possible security challenges for emergency response communications include privacy or 
confidentiality, data integrity, authentication, key management, and access control [2]. The 
following subsections describe these challenges in brief.      
2.1. Privacy 
The privacy or confidentiality ensures that the information is available only to the authorized 
persons and is achieved by applying cryptographic techniques. In emergency response 
communications, various rescue teams use the same network and it is required that each 
organization receives the information intended for it. The data should be encrypted in order to 
provide right information to the right person [17]. For example; the patient’s medical history 
should be available in comprehensible format to the medical teams only. The emergency 
communication networks use resource constrained mobile devices and require a light weight 
cryptographic system [12]. The traditional public/private key cryptography is not suitable for 
such networks as it requires more computations and consumes more battery power.  
2.2. Data Integrity  
Data integrity confirms the completeness or accuracy of the transmitted information and ensures 
that no one has changed it on the way. The deliberate or accidental modification of the sensitive 
information, such as patient’s medical history, accessed at the emergency site from some remote 
hospital database might create more panic situation. The alteration of the information 
representing instructions from command headquarters to first responders might also result into 
mismanagement of emergency response efforts.   
2.3. Authentication 
Authentication is the process of verifying the identity of someone or something. An 
authentication mechanism should ensure that only the right persons access the information 
depending upon the application requirements [17]. When the emergency network is used to 
transfer medical history, the user authentication is required for providing information to the 
legitimate person [9]. A flexible security model is required for authenticating medical staff 
when accessing patient history from hospital database. The medical teams should also be able to 
handoff access rights to other peers when required [12].   
2.4. Key Management  
It is worthwhile to exchange security credentials (such as, keys, digital certificates) efficiently 
during emergency response communications. These security credentials help first responders in 
performing certain security functions such as authentication and encryption. In a large scale 
emergency response scenario, it is not possible to assume that all the rescue organizations have 
exchanged security credentials before joining the emergency response network. There is a need 
of developing an efficient key distribution and management scheme for such type of situations 
[18].  
2.5. Access Control 
In life threatening situations, such as emergency response, the legitimate user must have 
immediate access to the required information that might save someone’s life [18]. Access-
control policies provide access to critical data, such as patient’s healthcare information, under 
various constraints and environments. Normally, the access is provided depending upon the 
identity, time and location constraints. For example; a physician can access patient’s 
information between 9.00 AM to 5.00 PM within the boundaries of the hospital. This prevents a 
physician to access the same information from emergency site. It is required to develop an 
adaptive access-control system suitable for emergency situations. The information should also 
be available for access to the legitimate users all the times. 
3. SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS IN 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE   
An emergency and disaster response model is presented, which makes use of the ambient 
intelligence (AmI) technologies to support communications among participating rescue teams 
such as police, fire fighters and ambulance services [6]. The ambient intelligence technologies 
provide adaptive and assistive services to users by assuming a great number of interoperating 
devices such as sensors, actuators and other devices performing storage, processing and 
communication of data. Figure 1 describes the scenario. The hospitals, police cars, ambulances, 
fire fighters and medical teams are integrated in to a single virtual team performing disaster 
management operations. The system uses body area network (BAN), personal area network 
(PAN), mesh network, ad hoc network, sensor network, cellular network, terrestrial trunked 
radio (TETRA) network and global network as communication means. The proposed system is 
a conceptual scenario for future emergency response communications. As shown in figure 1, the 
information may flow through heterogeneous networks under different administrative controls. 
It is possible that some nodes might intercept secret information, such as patient’s history, or 
generate fake information. Privacy and authentication are the key requirements in this type of 
scenario for reliable communications. The access to patient’s history at some remote hospital 
from the emergency site also requires an adaptive access control mechanism. The data integrity 
is also crucial as the emergency related information passing through heterogeneous networks 
may also be modified intentionally or accidentally.  
 
Figure 1: Ambient intelligence technologies for emergency support [6] 
A project had been initiated in Romania to develop a disaster response communication system 
for providing services such as quick information and alert dissemination to people, collaboration 
and coordination among rescue teams, information aggregation and personal assistance in 
emergency situations [7]. The system uses modern mobile communication technologies to 
provide a useful instrument to the government for controlling emergency situations. The general 
architecture of the system is presented in figure 2. This is a multi-step model comprising of four 
steps or modules. In first step, the disaster warnings are communicated to potentially affected 
people through traditional communications infrastructure, such as cellular phones. This creates 
awareness among people so that they may make appropriate arrangements to reduce the 
potential loss of life and other resources. In second step, the system communicates the aggregate 
information from rescue teams to decision makers for efficient and timely decision making. In 
third step, rescue teams collaborate and coordinate with each other and in the final step; affected 
people receive assistance in the shape of building plans, directions and possible exit routes in 
damaged buildings. It is apparent from figure 2 that various remote entities communicate with 
each other and exchange emergency related information. Authentication is required during the 
propagation of warnings to potentially affected people for avoiding rumours. An adaptive access 
control mechanism is also necessary to have immediate access to some life saving information 
at the emergency site. The privacy and data integrity are also essential for providing secrecy and 
accuracy to the sensitive information such as medical history of affected people.  
An emergency communication system, called digital ubiquitous mobile broadband OLSR 
network (DUMBONET) is proposed for exchanging real time multimedia information in search 
and rescue operations in disaster affected areas [8]. It connects various disaster affected areas 
and command centre through long delay satellite links. Every site has its own mobile ad hoc 
network for communications among first responders. The mobile node in DUMBONET may be 
a light weight laptop computer or a personal digital assistant (PDA). The system allows every 
rescuer and command headquarter to communicate and coordinate by using video, voice and 
short messages. The DUMBONET uses geostationary satellite providing broadband 
connectivity among disaster sites and central command headquarter and is shown in figure 3.  
  
The key security challenges for DUMBONET include privacy, authentication, data integrity and 
access control. The privacy is required for secure exchange of secret information through 
multiple emergency sites. Authentication is required for reliable communications among head 
command centre and various disaster areas. The flow of information through multiple disaster 
areas requires the implementation of a data integrity mechanism that identifies the deliberate or 
accidental information modifications. An adaptive access control mechanism is also vital for 
quick access to life saving information at the emergency site.  
 
 
Figure 2: Government controlled citizen’s safety system [7]  
 
Figure 3: DUMBONET test bed [8] 
A disaster response communication framework, called self-organizing ad hoc network for first 
responders (SAFIRE) is proposed to facilitate information exchange among first responders [9]. 
It provides a decentralized cognitive radio based approach for supporting interoperability, better 
performance and usability. It provides publish-subscribe service, where some nodes publish the 
information and others subscribe to access the same. It comprises of four modules namely 
publish-subscribe module, routing/forwarding engine, radio module and policy module. The 
publish-subscribe module is used for storing and accessing information contents. The 
routing/forwarding engine is responsible for finding routes and forwarding data over them. The 
radio module manages the cognitive radio configuration and the policy module forms rules and 
regulations for all integrated modules.  The SAFIRE system is shown in figure 4. The SAFIRE 
is a content-based emergency response system, where nodes publish and subscribe emergency 
related information for efficient emergency management operations. The key security 
challenges for SAFIRE include authentication, data integrity and access control. Authentication 
is required to verify the identity of the source publishing the information to avoid incorrect 
information retrieval. The information might be modified on the way, so a data integrity 
mechanism is also required. The medical teams at emergency sites may require an adaptive 
access control mechanism to quickly access the life saving information from some remote 
hospital database. The privacy is also essential for secure exchange of sensitive data such as 
patient’s history.    
  
 
Figure 4: SAFIRE system [9]   
A public safety and disaster recovery communications system is proposed to facilitate 
communications among first responders during emergency situations [2]. The framework 
comprises of four types of communication networks including personal area network (PAN), 
incident area network (IAN), jurisdiction area network (JAN) and extended area network (EAN) 
as shown in figure 5. A PAN interconnects various devices carried by individual rescue team 
members. An IAN is a network that is established temporarily at the incident site among first 
responders. A JAN is a permanent network typically installed by public safety agencies or 
municipalities to provide wide area connectivity. An EAN provides wide area connectivity 
among various regional, state and national public safety networks. The proposed public safety 
system is a conceptual framework for supporting information exchange among first responders 
and emergency headquarters during emergency management operations. The privacy is required 
to hide the secret information travelling through heterogeneous networks from unauthorized 
users. Data integrity is essential because the information travelling through heterogeneous 
networks managed by different entities might be changed on the way. Authentication is required 
for identifying the legitimate users for authentic information exchange at all network levels.  
 
 
Figure 5: Public safety communications system [2]  
A post-disaster telecommunication network using cognitive agents has been proposed in [10]. 
The proposed framework provides immediate post-disaster communications facility to the 
surviving mobile nodes and enables them to communicate among them and disaster information 
centre (DIC). The communication among them takes place through some surviving base stations 
and satellite links. Figure 6 describes the proposed framework. Four cognitive agents, namely, 
emergency identifier (EI) agent, topology explorer (TE) agent, information gatherer (IG) agent 
and information disseminator (ID) agent are available in every mobile node. The EI agent roams 
around the environment and collects information about the current network state and identifies 
emergency situations. The TE agent monitors the dynamic network topology when nodes join 
and leave the network. The IG agent gathers information from the network and other agents 
having different parent nodes. The ID agent is initiated by a mobile node which has some 
information to disseminate about the environment and surviving neighbouring nodes. The key 
security challenge for the proposed framework is authentication. Without proper authentication, 
a compromised node might generate false emergency information creating panic situation. 
While exchanging emergency related information, every agent should verify the identity of the 
information source before taking appropriate action.  
4. SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS IN 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE   
A distributed search and rescue system comprising of humans, sensors and robots has been 
proposed for emergency situations [11]. This system is especially designed for finding exit 
routes for affected people from damaged buildings during emergency situations. The sensors 
collect the information of their local environments and exchange it for further analysis. The 
maps are generated from this information and used by humans and robots to navigate the target 
while avoiding dangerous areas. The proposed system is shown in figure 7. The proposed 
system was experimented by using mobile robots equipped with sensors for detecting fire 
gradients. When the robots reach near fire, they stop there and move towards the building exit 
after receiving appropriate instructions. The proposed system generates the exit route maps 
depending upon the information provided by the sensors. It is vital to validate the information in 
order to generate the correct maps. Authentication and data integrity are crucial for the proposed 
scheme. Authentication is required for validating the information source and data integrity is 
necessary to validate the completeness and accuracy of the received information, which is 
necessary for generating correct exit route maps.     
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Figure 6: Post-disaster agent based communications [10]  
 
 
Figure 7: Sensors and robots in search operation [11]  
A sensor-based ad hoc network called CodeBlue is proposed for emergency medical care 
consisting of vital sign sensors, personal digital assistants (PDAs) and personal computer (PC) 
systems [12]. The system enables medical teams to assess the condition of patients at the 
emergency site and ensures seamless transfer of data among medical personnel. This 
architecture provides reliable data transfer and a decentralized security system as shown in 
figure 8. It provides handoff of credentials across rescue personnel and seamless access control 
across patient’s transfer. The CodeBlue uses publish/subscribe model for data delivery. The 
sensor nodes publish vital signs, location information and identities. The physicians subscribe to 
this information through PDAs and PC systems to monitor patient’s status. The major security 
services offered by CodeBlue include authentication and encryption. It is desired to develop 
light-weight cryptographic techniques for resource constrained mobile nodes in CodeBlue. The 
encryption service also provides confidentiality of critical information, such as vital signs of 
patients.  
 
 
Figure 8: CodeBlue architecture [12] 
An efficient disaster management communication and information system (DMCIS) is proposed 
to generate and communicate pre-disaster warnings to potentially affected people [13]. The 
proposed architecture comprises of wireless sensor networks and mobile ad hoc networks for 
collecting data about disaster hotspots and emergency situations. The framework is divided into 
four levels, where each level interacts with other levels in providing related disaster information 
at the appropriate place. At the first level, the sensor nodes deployed at sensor and data 
collection centre (SDCC) monitor the vital parameter changes (i.e., level of water in the river for 
flood warning) and then send them to the SDCC. The data acquisition process at SDCC is 
shown in figure 9. At level 2, an ad hoc network is formed for data transmission from SDCC to 
data processing center (DPC). This communication is facilitated through a vehicle mounted 
mobile access point (MAP) using Wi-Fi technology. At level 3, the acquired data at the DPC is 
processed. A DPC also maintains detailed past records related with disasters for the areas 
associated with it. Once the DPC processes the data, it is transferred to the central data centre 
(CDC) through wired or wireless communications. At level 4, the CDC checks the similarities 
of the information with past records of previous disasters.  When CDC finds high probability of 
a disaster, it requests decision and command centre (DCC) to take responsive actions. The DCC 
in turn calls the police, fire, medical and other emergency services to reach at the disaster site. 
To warn people about the potential disaster, the DCC sends information to the local mobile 
phone service providers to disseminate the warnings via short message services (SMS) to their 
subscribers. The main security challenges for DMCIS include authentication, and data integrity. 
Authentication is required to validate the source of the information as the sensor nodes at SDCC 
are installed openly and might be compromised. The data integrity is required to validate the 
completeness and accuracy of the information sent by the sensors for correct prediction of the 
potential emergency situation. The authentication and data integrity services should be available 
at all levels of the proposed scheme.   
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Figure 9: Data collection at SDCC [13]  
5. SECURITY CHALLENGES FOR WIRELESS MESH NETWORKS IN 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE   
A crisis management system, called GeoBIPS, has been proposed to provide timely and up-to-
date information during crisis situations [14]. The GeoBIPS is a self-forming broadband 
wireless mesh network used by reconnaissance team members (RT) and commanding officer 
(CO). The relay network is serving as an interface between RT and CO passing information in 
both directions. This enables CO to acquire up to date information from RT members, convey 
information to the crisis centre for decision making and send useful data and instructions to RT 
members. The GeoBIPS architecture is shown in figure 10. The portable access router (PAR) 
receives digital video data and sends it over a wireless interface to CO and embedded server. 
The mobile access router (MAR) connects to the crisis centre by using a local hotspot, general 
packet radio service (GPRS) or a universal mobile telephone system (UMTS) connection. The 
security is provided through IP security (IPSec) tunnel between MAR and PAR for secure voice 
and video communications. The MAR is provided with pre-shared authentication key used to 
sign all OLSR routing messages to prevent malicious nodes from entering the network. The 
privacy is achieved through IPSec service.  
A ballooned wireless mesh network is proposed to provide reliable communication means for 
exchanging information relating to disaster area, resident’s safety and relief services during 
emergency situations [15]. The system comprises of multiple ballooned wireless nodes, which 
are hanged 40 meters above in the sky, fixed access point, mobile notebook PCs and wireless IP 
phones as shown in figure 11. The network is connected to the Internet and disaster information 
server (DIS) through fixed access point. It is apparent from figure 11 that the main source of 
communication among first responders at the emergency site and the disaster information server 
is the ballooned nodes. If some ballooned node is compromised, it might create communication 
interruptions or generate fake information to be exchanged between first responders at 
emergency site and disaster information server. Authentication is required to overcome this 
problem. Data integrity also counts as the exchange of incomplete and inaccurate information 
between emergency site and disaster information server might result into mismanagement of 
emergency response efforts. Privacy is also essential for the exchange of secret information 
among first responders and emergency information centre.    
 
 
Figure 10: GeoBIPS architecture [14] 
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Figure 11: Ballooned emergency response network [15]  
6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
FRAMEWORKS  
It has been observed from section 3, section 4 and section 5 that the majority of the proposed 
emergency response communication systems do not provide adequate security services for 
reliable and secure information exchange. In this section, we provide a comparative analysis of 
the proposed schemes based on the security services offered by them as shown in Table I. It is 
mentioned in Table I that the proposed schemes except CodeBlue and GeoBIPS don’t provide 
any security service for reliable and secure information exchange. The authentication is only 
provided by the CodeBlue and GeoBIPS schemes, so it is possible to validate the identity of the 
information source. If the source is reliable, the information might be entertained, otherwise it 
might be ignored. For the rest of the schemes, a malicious node might impersonate a reliable 
node and generate fake information that might be harmful for the emergency response efforts. 
The privacy service is also provided by the CodeBlue and GeoBIPS only, so a malicious user or 
node cannot intercept the secret information on the way in those schemes. For other schemes, it 
is an easy task for a malicious node to intercept and misuse the secret information. The lack of 
an adaptive access control scheme in ambient intelligence framework, government controlled 
safety system, DUMBONET, and SAFIRE schemes prevents a physician to access the medical 
history information of the patients at the emergency site that might result into the loss of their 
lives. The data integrity check is also desired for all the schemes except CodeBlue and GeoBIPS 
for identifying the correctness and completeness of the received information, as an incomplete 
and inaccurate information might be dangerous. If the participating rescue teams belong to 
different rescue organizations, then a dynamic key distribution and management scheme is also 
required for authentication and encryption services.  
Table I: Security services for emergency response communications 
Category Proposed Scheme Available 
Security Services 
Required 
Security Services 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mobile Ad Hoc 
Network 
Ambient 
Intelligence 
Framework 
 
None 
Privacy, Data 
Integrity, 
Authentication, 
Access Control 
Government 
Controlled Safety 
System 
 
None 
Authentication, 
Access Control, 
Privacy, Data 
Integrity 
 
DUMBONET 
 
None 
Privacy, Data 
Integrity, 
Authentication, 
Access Control 
 
SAFIRE 
 
None 
Authentication, 
Privacy, Data 
Integrity, Access 
Control 
Public Safety 
System 
 
None 
Privacy, Data 
Integrity, 
Authentication 
Post-Disaster 
Communication 
System 
 
None 
Authentication 
 
 
Wireless Sensor 
Network 
Search and Rescue 
System 
None Authentication, 
Data Integrity 
 
CodeBlue 
Authentication, 
Privacy 
More lightweight 
cryptographic 
schemes 
DMCIS None Authentication, 
Data Integrity 
 
Wireless Mesh 
Network 
GeoBIPS Authentication, 
Privacy 
None 
Ballooned 
Emergency 
System 
None Authentication, 
Data Integrity, 
Privacy 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS  
This paper presents a survey of various communication frameworks for emergency response 
along with their security requirements. The majority of the proposed schemes lack the security 
services required for reliable and secure information exchange. The key security services 
include privacy, data integrity, authentication, key management and access control. In real life, 
there is a possibility that some nodes might demonstrate malicious behaviour by intercepting 
secret information or impersonate a reliable node and generate fake information. These 
behaviours affect the reliability of the emergency response networks and might result into 
mismanagement of emergency response efforts. It is required that the key security services may 
be incorporate in the proposed frameworks so that the reliable and secure information exchange 
might be made possible.    
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